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THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT REVISITED:




Beginning with the case of Weems v. United States,1 in 1909, the
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the eighth amendment of
the Constitution 2 to impose a requirement of proportionality in criminal
sentencing. The requirement of proportionality implies that the severity
of a punishment must be graduated to the severity of the offense for
which it is imposed. This Article proposes that current state determinate
sentencing statutes are defective and violate the eighth amendment be-
cause the penalty terms contained within them have been "fixed" arbi-
trarily by legislatures without giving adequate and systematic
consideration to the offense and punishment severity-therefore failing
the test of proportionality.
To correct the disproportionality inherent in current state penal
codes, we suggest that the statutes be rewritten to impose punishments
based on an empirically derived offense severity scale, which assesses the
weight of each offense in terms of its social harm. The Sellin-Wolfgang
crime severity scale 3 is a good example of this concept. The scale utilizes
an empirical measure of the community's perception of various offenses
to rank the offenses according to their severity. By determining the
quantum of each offense's severity, a sequence of severity ratios is ob-
tained, which in effect ranks all offenses in a severity continuum. Such a
ranking can be utilized to determine a penalty scale that is commensu-
* The sections on the Puerto Rico punishment provisions and the proposed sentencing
model are a revised version of pp. 223-40 of the author's Ph.D. dissertation entitled, Penal
Codification in Puerto Rico: A Sentencing Model (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1981).
** Associate Professor of Law, Inter-American University. Ph.D., University of Penn-
sylvania, 1981; M.A. (Criminology and Criminal Law), University of Pennsylvania, 1976;
J.D., University of Puerto Rico, 1972; B.A., University of Puerto Rico, 1968.
1 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
2 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3 T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964).
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rate with the offenses, thus satisfying the eighth amendment's prohibi-
tion against disproportionate penalties.
As an appropriate method to satisfy the constitutional mandate of
proportionality, we recommend that legislators use an empirically de-
rived offense severity scale-modelled after the Sellin-Wolfgang scale 4 -
in determining statutory penalty terms.
II. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments originated
in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.5 One commentator has noted that
the English provision "was first, an objection to the imposition of pun-
ishments which were unauthorized by statute and outside the jurisdic-
tion of the sentencing court, and second, a reiteration of the English
policy against disproportionate penalties."' 6 This policy was considered,
furthermore, to reflect a long-established English tradition, already codi-
fied in the Magna Carta, against disproportionate punishments.
7
As originally interpreted in the United States, the constitutional
phrase "nor cruel and unusual punishments" was intended to prohibit
only barbarous punishments." This "traditional" interpretation of the
eighth amendment was first expressed as:
punishments of torture, such as those mentioned by the Commentator
[Blackstone] [e.g., drawing or dragging of the prisoner to the place of exe-
cution, disembowelling alive, beheading, quartering, public dissection,
burning alive] . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty,
are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution.9
The first Supreme Court opinion to discuss the issue of proportion-
ality between offense and punishment severity was the dissent written by
4 Id.
5 The Virginia Constitution of 1776 copied the "cruel and unusual punishment" provi-
sion verbatim from the English statute. Eight states followed Virginia in including a prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishments in their constitutions, and by 1787, the federal
government included it in the Northwest Ordinance. By 1791, the prohibition was enacted as
the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Inf'cted-" The Orginal Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. RaV. 839 (1969).
6 Id. at 860.
7 Id. at 846.
8 Id. at 842.
9 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (death by firing squad sustained because it
was common military punishment). The "traditional" approach was followed in Louisianaex
rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (a second electrocution attempt caused by mal-
functioning of the electric chair in the first attempt is not cruel and unusual punishment);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-95 (1910) (White, C.J., dissenting); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) (the eighth amendment held to prohibit inhuman or
barbarous punishments such as "burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel
."; therefore, death by electrocution is legal).
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Justice Field in O'Neil v. Vermont. 10 Although Justice Field acknowl-
edged the "traditional" interpretation of the eighth amendment, 1' he
also interpreted the amendment to prohibit "all punishments which by
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the of-
fences [sic] charged."'
2
In Weems v. United States, the Court stated that "it is a precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and propor-
tioned to offense."' 13 Thus, the Supreme Court adopted a requirement
of proportionality as part of its eighth amendment analysis.
The Court in Weems utilized the following tests to weigh the sever-
ity of the punishment. First, the Court compared the challenged pun-
ishment to statutory penalties for the same offense in various other
states, in terms of severity and kind. Second, the Court compared the
challenged penalty to penalties for more serious offenses, both at the
federal and the state levels. Third, the Court compared the penalties for
different behavior which would fall under the same offense for which
Weems was convicted.
14
The Weems decision also introduced the notion that the meaning of
the amendment could change over time because it relies on the percep-
tion of offense and punishment severity held by the community. 15 This
view served as a basis for the "evolving standards of decency" approach
which is implicit in the modern interpretation of the eighth
amendment.16
During the last decade, both the proportionality' 7 and the evolving
10 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). Although the first eighth amendment
case before the Supreme Court was based on a proportionality challenge to a state sentence,
the Court did not consider it, holding that the amendment did not apply to the states.
Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867). But see Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962) (the eighth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment).
11 144 U.S. at 339 (Field, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 339-40. Defendant was fined $6,638.72 for 307 charges of selling liquor illegally
in Vermont. A subsidiary punishment of three days of forced labor for each one dollar fined
was also set. By the Court's calculation, this would have required defendant to serve 19,914
days of imprisonment.
13 217 U.S. at 367. Weems was convicted under the Phillipines Penal Code of falsifying
an official public document. The penalty challenged was a fine, 15 years of chained impris-
onment and forced labor, plus accessory penalties of civil interdiction: subjection to surveil-
lance as well as perpetual absolute disqualifications to vote, hold elected office, acquire
honors, and receive retirement pay.
14 217 U.S. at 363-66. For a discusson of the constitutionality of the punishment imposed
upon Weems, see id. at 380-82.
15 Id. at 373.
16 The "evolving standards of decency" approach was first adopted in Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (denationalization as punishment for wartime desertion).
17 See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Coker v.
[Vol. 75
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standards of decency' 8 approaches have gained recognition over the
"traditional" approach. An evolving standard of decency analysis re-
quires "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given
sanction."1 9 Valid indicators for assessing contemporary standards of
decency include existing penalties either statutorily fixed by the legisla-
ture20 or imposed by the jury,2' societal values and norms as identified
by prior court opinions, history and tradition, public opinion, and uni-
versal moral precepts.
22
In assessing proportionality between offense and punishment sever-
ity, courts require consideration of the following criteria: nature and
gravity of the offense, punishments for the same offense in other jurisdic-
tions, penalties for more serious offenses in other jurisdictions, sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, acceptable goals of
punishment, and evolving standards of decency.
23
In the recent decision of Solem v. Helm,24 the Court indicated that
application of the aforementioned criteria "assumes that courts are com-
petent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale."
'25
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape is excessively disproportionate to the
severity of the offense); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976) (the plurality opinion recognized the proportionality requirement but said that
the death penalty is appropriate for the most serious offenses); cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). For an
excellent analysis of the evolution of the proportionality approach in both federal and state
courts, see Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William
Runmel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 378 (1980).
18 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 172-76; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288-90 (1976);
Furman, 408 U.S. at 330-32 (Marshall, J., concurring); see generally Rudolph v. Alabama, 375
U.S. 889 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
19 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 278.
20 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (fixing the duration of penalties is the re-
sponsibility of the legislature, however, the court should intervene in cases of grossly dispro-
portionate application); cf. Solem v. Helm 103 S. Ct. at 3015-16 (distinguishing the stringent
South Dakota parole system from the one in Rummel); Wood;-on, 428 U.S. at 288 & n.12; Gregg,
428 U.S. at 174 & n. 19; Furman, 408 U.S. at 436-37 (Powell, J., dissenting); Weems, 217 U.S. at
377.
21 Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 288-89; Furman,
408 U.S. at 439-40 (Powell, J., dissenting); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 201-02
(1971); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 513 n.5, 519 (1968) (an important function of
the jury is to maintain a link between contemporary values and the penal system).
22 See cases cited in Woodson, 428 U.S. at 288 n. 11; Furman 408 U.S. at 274-78 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). See generally Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1970).
23 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting); cf. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d
410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (setting out criteria as: degree of danger that the
offender represents to society, comparison of the challenged penalty with that of more severe
offenses in that jurisdiction, and with the penalty for the same offense in other jurisdictions);
accord In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
24 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
25 Id. at 3011.
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The Court stated further that, "[c]omparisons can be made in light of
the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpabil-
ity of the offender".26 These statements invite the use of offense severity
scales in future proportionality analyses under the eighth amendment.
2 7
One of the clearest interpretations of the eighth amendment's pro-
hibition was given by Justice Brennan, concurring in Furman v. Georgia.28
Justice Brennan enunciated various principles of punishment that in-
clude: (1) that punishment is "unnecessary," and hence "excessive,"
and prohibited as cruel and unusual "[i]f there is a significantly less se-
vere punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punish-
ment is inflicted";2 9 (2) that the State must not inflict severe punishment
arbitrarily;30 (3) that the "judicial determination is as objective as possi-
ble";3 1 and (4) that punishment must comport with human dignity.
32
Current discussions on sentencing revolve around these principles.
The first principle, referred to in the literature as parsimony or sub-
sidiarity, 33 recommends that the least restrictive sanction necessary to
achieve defined social purposes be chosen. This principle was first enun-
ciated in the Model Penal Code, along with the recognition that impris-
onment should be a punishment of last resort. 34 In response to this
principle, the proposed Federal Criminal Code is heavily weighted to-
ward probation or conditional discharge rather than imprisonment.
3 5
This principle also explains the trend in current codes to add a proba-
tionary component to sentences of imprisonment.3 6 Furthermore, non-
26 Id.
27 Interestingly, the Court in Solem, asserting that "there are widely shared views as to the
relative seriousness of crimes," id. at 3011, took judicial notice of the empirical research done
by Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Dift r-
ences, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 224, 237 (1974). This study, performed in Baltimore, developed an
offense seriousness scale akin to the Sellin-Wolfgang severity scale.
28 408 U.S. at 257, (Brennan, J., concurring).
29 Id. at 279.
30 Id. at 274.
31 Id. at 277.
32 Id. at 270, 273.
33 See N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 58 (1974) (parsimony); A. VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS; REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR
THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION (1976). For several Supreme Court decisions that incorpo-
rate the parsimony requirement either implicitly or explicitly, see Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1909).
34 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 7.01(1), 7.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
35 CRIMINAL CODE REVISION ACT OF 1979, S. 1723, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 3103, 3702
(1979).
36 In addition to this constitutional rationale, statutory preference for probation is cur-
rently explained in terms of the following rationales: 1) probation has proved to be more
effective in dealing with social re-adaptation of the offender since it does not involve complete
dislocation from the community; 2) it is less costly than imprisonment; and 3) it gives a mar-
gin to the sentencing judge to deal with contingencies not considered by the Legislature in
[Vol. 75
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incarcerative sanctions such as warning and release, intermittent con-
finement, supervision, free labor, restitution, and civil disabilities, are
prescribed for most non-violent offenses.
37
The second principle stated by Justice Brennan in Funnan,38 as well
as by Justice Powell in So/em,39 is non-arbitrariness, which requires an
objective judicial determination of the sanction. Objectivity in sentenc-
ing requires both parity-the imposition of equal sanctions to similarly
situated offenders-and proportionality-sanctions proportional to the
seriousness of the offense.40
Despite the criteria established by the Supreme Court to evaluate
whether a punishment comports with the eighth amendment, the Amer-
ican legal system has paid scant attention to the perceived severity of
penalties or to the scaling of offenses and punishments.4 1 Current state
sentencing statutes, therefore, are constitutionally challengeable because
they confer unstructured discretion to sentencing judges. Furthermore,
the statutes arbitrarily impose penalty terms, regardless of proportion to
social harm, to other offenses and to sentencing alternatives, thus violat-
ing the proportionality requirement.
The Supreme Court has mandated, moreover, that the socially per-
ceived severity of a crime be considered in assessing the degree of offense
seriousness for penal statutes.42 The sanction for a criminal offense
should reflect its severity in terms of social harm. In order to weigh the
seriousness of offenses to determine appropriate sanctions, courts need a
defining and classifying offenses. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, 2 WORKING PAPERS, 1268-69; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTIcE, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, Standard 2.3 commentary at 63-
73 (1968).
37 CRIMINAL CODE REVIsION ACT OF 1979, supra note 35; MODEL SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS ACT (1979).
38 408 U.S. at 276 (Brennan, J., concurring).
39 103 S. Ct. at 3010.
40 See alSo CRIMINAL CODE REVISION ACT OF 1979, S. 1723, 96th Cong., Ist. Sess.,
§ 3102(b), which states: "The term 'punishment commensurate with the seriousness of the
offense' means that the severity of the sentence is proportionate and directly related to the
severity of the offense and the harm done and that similar crimes committed under similar
circumstances receive similar sentences." Note that § 3102(b) includes the requirement of
parity as part of the principle of proportionality.
41 The research done is limited to the following references: Hamilton & Rotkin, Interpreting
the Eighth Amendment: Perceived Seriousness of Crime and Severity of Punishment, in CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976); Wolfgang, Seriousness of
Crime anda Poliy ofjuvenile justice, in DELINQUENCY, CRIME AND SOCIETY (J. Short ed. 1976);
Buchner, Scale of Sentence Severity, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 182 (1979); Erickson &
Gibbs, On the Perceived Severity ofLegal Penalties, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 102 (1979);
Sebba, Some Explorations in the Scaling of Penalties, 15 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY
247 (1978); Wolfgang, Real and Perceived Changes in Crime and Punishment, 107 J. AM. ACAD.
ARTS & Sci 143 (1978).
42 Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3010-12.
1984]
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system of reference against which to evaluate the proportionality of the
sanction relative to other crimes and to the social harm inflicted by the
crime along a single dimension. Such a system of reference may be pro-
vided by crime severity scales.
III. SCALING OFFENSES
The concept of scaling offense and sanction severity was an issue as
early as 1764, when Cesare Beccaria proposed that legislators should de-
velop a scale of offense severity, ranging from the slightest misbehavior
to the most serious crime, with a corresponding scale for the severity of
sanctions.
43
During the late 1950's, Professor Hart wrote that "the grading of
offenses was not only proper but essential."144 He asserted further that
"the grading should be done with primary regard for the relative blame-
worthiness of offenses," in other words, by taking into account the rela-
tive extent of the harm and the community's view of the gravity of the
misconduct.45 Such grading, consequently, should be determinative of
the relative severity of the punishment authorized for each offense by
the community.
The pioneering work of Professors Thorsten Sellin and Marvin
Wolfgang' 6 during the early 1960's first produced a valid 47 and relia-
ble48 unidimensional seriousness scale that grades and ranks offenses ac-
43 C. BEcCARIA, DE LOS DELITOS Y LAS PENAS [OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS] 184-87
Uuridica Hispano-America ed. 1958).
44 Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 426 (1958).
45 Id. Note that Justice Powell made a similar statement in Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3011.
46 T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, supra note 3.
47 Id. at 227-38. For other research that validates the Sellin-Wolfgang severity scale, see
Riedel, Perceived Circumstances, Inferences of Intent andJudgments of Offense Seriousness, 66 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201 (1975); Bridges & Lisagor, Scaling Seriousness: An Evaluation ofMagnitude
and Categomy Scaling Techniques, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 215 (1975); Wellford & Wia-
trowski, On the Measurement of Delinqueng, 66 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1975).
48 T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, supra note 3, at 320-2 1. Reliability refers to the extent to
which a measurement procedure yields similar results on repeated trials. The Sellin-Wolf-
gang severity scale has been derived successfully in a variety of different cultural milieus
through a number of replication studies that yield crime severity ratios consistent with their
study. See, e.g., Akman, Normandeau & Turner, The Measurement of Delinqueng in Canada, 58 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 330 (1967); De Boech & Houchon, Prolegomenes a Une Statistique
Criminelle Congolaise, 6 CAHIERS ECONOMIQUES ET SOCAUX no. 3-4 (1968); Hsu, Cultural and
Sexual Dioerences on the Judgment of Crimial Offenses, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 348
(1973); Normandeau, The Measurement ofDelinquency in Montreal, 57 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 172 (1966); Velez-Diaz & Megargee, An Investigation of Differences in Value Judgments between
Youthful Offenders and Non-Offenders in Puerto Rico, 61 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 549 (1971);
M. Hsu, The Measurement of Crime and Delinquency in Taipei (1968) (unpublished doc-
toral thesis for the University of Pennsylvania); Normandeau & A. Sa'danoer, Towards Mea-
surement of Crime and Delinquency in Indonesia, (1968) (unpublished manuscript for the
University of Padang; copy on file at Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law,
[Vol. 75
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cording to the relative harm inflicted upon the community. Although
their study was originally intended to develop a delinquency index, it
can also be used to rank code offenses.
In order to assess the community judgment concerning crime sever-
ity, a survey was carried out utilizing sampling techniques and statistical
analyses. The researchers constructed a questionnaire with various of-
fense descriptions. The basic components of the descriptions or "index"
elements, 49 were injury, theft, damage, and combinations of them. A
sample of the population was selected and asked to rate the severity of
the offense descriptions in comparison to a modulus. The results were
statistically analyzed.5 0 By utilizing this procedure, Sellin and Wolf-
gang obtained weighted scores for various crimes that were scaled on a
crime severity ratio scale.
The scale was designed on the assumption that it is possible to de-
compose a criminal event into its basic components, 51 e.g., injury, theft,
damage, and combinations of these.52 Similarly, the scale distinguishes
University of Pennsylvania); Normandeau & G. Reiss, Measuring Criminality in Brazil
(1968) (unpublished manuscript in the University of Mexico; copy on file at Center for Stud-
ies in Criminology and Criminal Law, Unriversity of Pennsylvania); R. Figlio, The National
Survey of Crime Severity: Some General Findings (1978) (manuscript in the Center of Stud-
ies in Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Pennsylvania); cf. Figlio, The Seriousness of
Offnses: An Eva luaton by Ofenders andNon-Offenders, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 189 (1 975)
(agreement as to relative offense ordering along the severity scale); Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk,
The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 224
(1974) (although using different offense descriptions from those of Sellin & Wolfgang's, the
study found overall agreement of offense seriousness between races and sexes of a Baltimore
household sample); Sechrest, Comparironr ofInmate's and Sta fsjudgments in the Severily of Offenses,
6J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 41 (1969) (obtained overall offense seriousness agree-
ment among inmates, staff members, correctional and parole agents; yet when the offenses
were drugs or false pretenses, actual offenders saw their offense as less serious than other
inmates did).
49 "Index" elements refers to the components of a criminal event as defined for use in the
Sellin-Wolfgang severity scale. T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, supra note 3, at chap. 10.
50 The procedure used is described as follows. The mean magnitude score for each lar-
ceny-which was derived by asking respondents to weigh how many times more serious than
a modulus was the offense description presented to them-was computed by using a regres-
sion equation for money values, since the only metrically defined variable is that of the dollar
value of theft. The regressed money values were then plotted on arithmetic coordinates and
further on log-log paper. This gave a power function of the form Y = aXb, which related the
subjective perception of seriousness of the offense to the amount of money stolen. Then, Sel-
lin and Wolfgang converted the offense score values to weights, by dividing each mean mag-
nitude scale value by the scale score for a theft of one dollar. The emerging scores generated a
crime severity ratio scale that covers a wide range of socially harmful behavior ranging from
very insignificant to serious crimes.
51 This assumption refers to additivity and is based on research in the field of psychophys-
ics. In 1978, Wolfgang and his associates successfully tested this assumption. See National
Survey of Crime Severity, Progress Reports (1978-81) (manuscript on file at the Center for
Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Pennsylvania).
52 See supira note 49.
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between attempts and completed offenses, and assesses the degree and
kind of participation in the criminal event. Thus, for example, a bur-
glary followed by a forcible rape, an attempt to kill, and the stealing of
$100, can be weighted in terms of the value of the property damaged
and stolen, number of premises forcibly entered, type and amount of
intimidation, number of victims of forcible sexual intercourse, and de-
gree and amount of personal injury. When each corresponding score of
the above offense elements or components is added, a weighted score
that measures the social harm resulting from the criminal event is
obtained.
The weighted scores reflect community judgments of the relative
seriousness of a variety of offenses.5 3 Thus, they constitute an appropri-
ate arrangement of offenses according to their seriousness. This in turn
provides a basis on which to select punishments proportionate to the
seriousness of the criminal conduct. The result is a scale of severity into
which all crimes and penalties should fit-indeed, the very same system
proposed by both Beccaria 54 and Hart.55
IV. THE PUERTO Rico PUNISHMENT PROVISIONS
The Puerto Rico Penal Code's sentencing provisions are based on
the various arguably irreconcilable aims of prevention, rehabilitation,
parity, retribution, and deterrence. 56 A presumptive determinate sen-
tence, which can be increased or decreased with evidence of aggravating
or mitigating factors, is statutorily prescribed for each felony.
5 7
The presumptive term for each felony is set at three-fifths of the
maximum penalty under the previous indeterminate sentencing provi-
sions.58 The fixed term may be either reduced or increased by the pres-
ence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances at fixed proportions
of the previous law.59 Because the previous penalty range had not been
determined objectively according to the seriousness of each criminal act
against society, the resulting determinate sentencing provisions suffer
53 Note that in Solem, Justice Powell stated that comparisons of offenses in terms of "harm
caused or threatened to the victim or society" and culpability of offender were relevant in the
consideration of criterion of severity of the offense in a proportionality analysis. 103 S. Ct. at
3011.
54 See C. BECCARIA, supora note 43.
55 See H. HART, supra note 44.
56 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 3284 (1982).
57 Id. at tit. 34, § 1044; tit. 33 § 3005.
58 Puerto Rico, 34 LEG. REc. no. 37 740-41.
59 The fixed term may vary two-fifths of the maximum penalty under the previous stat-




from the same ailments described above-they do not satisfy the propor-
tionality requirement of the eighth amendment. I
The sentencing provisions of the Puerto Rican statute, from which
the determinate terms for the present law were chosen, have been de-
scribed by Professor Helen Silving as showing a "lack. . .of an overall
conception of the function of punishment scales in a system of criminal
justice .... ,o60 She also noted that, "[o]ne gains the impression that
the number of years suggested for any given crime is pulled out of a
magician's hat." 6' This observation may have sprung from the fact that
the penalty terms were inserted subsequently into spaces left blank in
the proposal submitted to the Puerto Rico Legislature.
62
As argued above, the Sellin-Wolfgang severity scale constitutes a
valid empirical frame of reference to compare offense provisions in terms
of severity. We will use the data of the national replication of the Sellin-
Wolfgang severity scale, performed by Professor Wolfgang and his asso-
ciates in 1978,63 to demonstrate that the penalty terms of the Puerto
Rico Penal Code violate the eighth amendment requirements of propor-
tionality and parity.
The presumptive penalty range for various offenses and their corre-
sponding range of weighted severity scores in the Sellin-Wolfgang scale
are displayed below in the following tables. Table 1 below includes var-
ious violent crimes that were selected arbitrarily to illustrate our point.
The Puerto Rico Penal Code typifies murder as "the killing of a
human being with malice aforethought."64 First degree murders are
those murders "perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait or torture
or any wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing .... -65 Felony
murders are those in which the death occurs during the commission,
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate, "arson, rape, sodomy, robbery,
60 Silving, Testimony of r He/en Silving on a Symposium at the Puerto Rico Bar Association on the
Projects of a New Penal Code for Puerto Rico, 41 Rv. JUR. U.P.R. 885, 892 (1972).
61 Id. at 886.
62 See Silving, id. at 892; Lopez Rey, La Reforma Penal, 26 REV. COL. AB. PR. 1, 108 (1967).
63 See National Survey of Crime Severity, Final National Level Geometric Means and
Ratio Scores by Offense Stimuli Items (1978) (Manuscript on file at the Center for Studies in
Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Pennsylvania). The severity score data pro-
vided by the national replication of the original Sellin-Wolfgang research study yield
weighted scores for multiple offenses. Such data is not available yet for the Puerto Rican
sample. Since a Pearson correlation of 0.9942 between the core items of the Puerto Rican
sample and the national sample was obtained, however, the whole set of severity scores for the
latter sample will be used in our study.
64 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 4001 (Supp. 1982).
65 Id. at § 4002.
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burglary, kidnapping, destruction, mayhem or escape .... -66 First de-
gree and felony murders carry a penalty of ninety-nine years. 67 Second
degree murders carry a presumptive penalty of eighteen years, which
can be reduced to twelve years or increased to thirty years, provided
that there are mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
68
An analysis of Table 1 shows that there is no rational connection
between the vast difference in penalties for first degree and second de-
gree murders and the narrow spread on the weighted severity range.
Table 1 further demonstrates the lack of consistency or guiding ra-
tionale in the selection of penalty terms for offenses within the 33-to-24
severity score range. For example, aggravated kidnapping falls within
this category with a base penalty of sixty years, within a statutory range
of forty to ninety-nine years;69 forcible rape, however, carries a presump-
TABLE 1









72- 43 Felony Murder 99
Murder:
47- 36 First Degree 99
28- 27 Second Degree 12- 18- 30
33- 24 Aggravated Kidnapping 40- 60- 99
Forcible Rape 20- 30- 50
Causing or Risking
Catastrophe 6- 10- 15
24-13 Arson 4- 6-10
Attempt to Murder:
25- 22 First Degree 10
18- 16 Second Degree 6- 9- 10
17- 9 Aggravated Bribery 8- 12 20
* The sources for Table I are the PUERTO Rico PENAL CODE, infra notes 64-74 and the
National Survey of Crime Severity, szpra note 63.
a The scale range goes from 1 to o.
The severity scores are rounded to the nearest whole number.
b This refers to PUERTO Rico PENAL CODE, as amended in 1983.
C In years of confinement.
66 Id.
67 Id. at § 4003.
68 Id.
69 Id. at § 4178(a).
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tive penalty of thirty years, with variations between twenty and fifty
years for mitigating and aggravating factors. 70 The offense of causing or
risking catastrophe carries a lower penalty of ten years, which varies
within a range of six to fifteen years. 7 1 In sum, penalties for offenses
within a 33-to-24 severity range fall within ninety-nine and six years.
No offense-punishment proportionality can be inferred from such dispa-
rate penalties.
A similar lack of proportionality is observed among the prescribed
statutory penalties for arson and attempt to murder, which fall within
the 24-to-13 weighted severity score range. Arson, for example, carries a
penalty of six years, which can fluctuate between four and ten years
depending on mitigating or aggravating circumstances.7 2 The penalty
for attempt to commit first degree murder is ten years, and nine years
for attempt to commit second degree murder, varying within a range of
six and ten years.
7 3
Table 1 also ranks the offense of aggravated bribery. This crime is
weighted at 17-to-9 on the severity score range and it carries a statutory
presumptive base penalty of twelve years, which may vary between
eight and twenty years.7 4 When the crime severity and statutory pen-
alty range of aggravated bribery are compared with those of arson and
attempt to commit second degree murder, we see a clear lack of propor-
tionality between perceived severity and prescribed level of punishment.
Aggravated bribery, with a lower severity range, carries a higher statu-
tory penalty range than the more serious offenses of causing catastrophe,
arson, and attempts to commit first and second degree murder.
Thus, in toto, Table 1 exemplifies the lack of proportionality be-
tween the statutory penalty terms of the Puerto Rico Penal Code and
the seriousness of their corresponding criminal activities as assessed
under the Sellin-Wolfgang offense severity scale. The table also demon-
strates a lack of rational proportion among the offenses in terms of seri-
ousness relative to other offenses. The result is that equally situated
offenders receive different punishments. Disparity is statutorily built
into the Puerto Rico Penal Code sentencing structure.
The lack of proportionality inherent in the Puerto Rican penal stat-
ute's crime-punishment catalogue is further demonstrated with data
concerning property offenses. Table 2 lists seven property offenses by
severity score range and statutory penalty.
70 Id. at § 4061.
71 Id. at § 4334.
72 Id. at § 4331.
73 Id. at § 3122.




WEIGHTED SEVERITY SCORE RANGE AND PENALTIES FOR
PROPERTY OFFENSES*
Weighted Severity Statutory Statutory
Score Rangea Offense Penaltyb
4- 21 Robbery 8- 12- 20
3- 16 Aggravated Burglary 8- 15- 18
2- 11 Aggravated Theft 6- 10-12
5- 10 Receipt of Stolen 2- 3- 5
Property
1- 3 Simple Burglary 6 months
and/or $500.
2- 4 Simple Theft 6 months
and/or $500.
* The sources for Table 2 are the PUERTO RIco PENAL CODE, infra notes 75-80, and the
National Survey of Crime Severity, supra note 63.
a The severity score range is from 1 to oo. The severity scores are rounded to the nearest
whole number.
b The penalty is in years of confinement. All of these offenses also provide for
restitution.
The broad overlapping of weighted seriousness among property of-
fenses is clear. No similar overlapping is present, however, among their
corresponding penalty terms. For example, the offense of receipt of sto-
len property prescribes a penalty of three years, varying within a range
of two to five years. 75 Although its seriousness range (5-to- 10) falls inside
that of the offenses of robbery (4-to-21), aggravated burglary (3-to-16),
and aggravated theft (2-to-11), the latter offenses carry higher penalties.
The penalty for robbery ranges from eight to twenty years, with a base
term of twelve years;76 for aggravated burglary, an eight to eighteen
years range, with a base term of fifteen years; 77 and for aggravated theft,
six to twelve years with a base of ten years.78 Similarly, the above penal-
ties do not acknowledge the overlap of seriousness between robbery, ag-
gravated burglary, and aggravated theft.
Table 2 also reveals that offenses such as simple burglary79 and sim-
ple theft, 0 carrying a penalty of six months and/or a $500 fine, may be
75 Id. at § 4276.
76 Id. at § 4271.
77 Id. at § 4272.
78 Id. at § 4274.
79 Id. at § 4277.
80 Id. at § 4279.
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as serious as either aggravated theft or aggravated burglary, each of
which carries a much higher penalty. Similarly, some aggravated thefts
and aggravated burglaries are considered less serious than such offenses
as receipt of stolen property, but the former carry much higher
penalties.
In sum, Tables 1 and 2 clearly demonstrate that the eighth amend-
ment's requirement of proportionality in sentencing is not satisfied by
the Puerto Rico Penal Code's sentencing structure. In terms of perceived
seriousness of harm to society, the statutory penalties do not share any
rational proportion with their corresponding offenses. Likewise, pre-
scribed punishments lack proportionality when compared to the severity
of other offenses along a seriousness dimension. Disparity, therefore, is
built into the statute. Moreover, the absence of weighted guidelines on
which to structure judicial discretion in those cases where mitigating
and aggravating circumstances must be examined violates the constitu-
tional requirement of objectivity in sentencing. The existence of institu-
tionalized arbitrariness is an unavoidable conclusion. Thus, we need to
find an alternative proposal for remodeling the Puerto Rican sentencing
process-one which incorporates the constitutional mandates of propor-
tionality and parity.
V. THE PROPOSED SENTENCING MODEL
The sanctioning rationale underlying our proposed crime-punish-
ment model is retribution or "just deserts"; with its orientation toward
the criminal acts themselves, it is possible to assess them objectively.
"Just deserts" implies gradation of sanctions depending on the degree of
social harm brought about by the crime.
A given criminal event may involve one or more offenses with dif-
ferent legal labels. Thus, in evaluating criminal conduct, we will utilize
as a unit of analysis the criminal event as a whole. We propose that a
weighted seriousness score be given to the criminal event through the
use of a measure such as the Sellin-Wolfgang severity scale. By using
such a scale, the sentencing authority is able to isolate the components
or elements of the criminal event, and give them differentiated numeri-
cal weights, previously obtained from the scale, which when added to-
gether yield the event's severity score. The total score value of an event,
thus, will depend on the number of elements it contains and their rela-
tive values on the scale. Each score represents a measure of perceived
severity of social harm. It is also a measure of the relative seriousness of
the criminal event as compared to other crimes.
As explained above, Sellin and Wolfgang identified the following as
basic components of the criminal event: injury, theft, property damage
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and combinations of these. They next determined the components' ra-
tio scores in the severity scale. They also obtained weighted severity
scores for aggravating factors such as intimidation, victim's hospitaliza-
tion, use of weapons, forcible entrance of premises, specific amount of
loss in dollars, and death. These elements are listed with their corre-
sponding weights in Table 3, below.
Table 3 illustrates the method for assessing the seriousness of crimi-
nal events that we propose should be incorporated into the Puerto Rico
Penal Code. The severity ratios of the major components of crime result
TABLE 3
SCORING SYSTEM FOR CRIMINAL EVENTS - PUERTO
RICAN SAMPLE*
Elements of the Criminal Event (Number) X (Weight) = Total
I- Number of victims of bodily 2
harm receiving minor injuries
treated and discharged 6
hospitalized 10
killed 23a




physical or verbal 5
weapon 6
IV- Number of premises forcibly 2
entered













* The sources for the data on the Puerto Rican Sample are the National Survey of Crime
Severity, supra note 63; D. Nevares-Muniz, supra note 81.
a The severity score is equal to 23.22.
b The severity score is equal to 22.55.
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from the statistical analysis of the responses of the Puerto Rican sample
used in the replication of the Sellin-Wolfgang severity scale, performed
by Wolfgang in 1978 throughout the United States population.8' We
propose that these severity ratios, rounded to the nearest whole number,
function as weights. In order to obtain a severity score for an entire
criminal event, one first breaks the event into its separate elements.
Next, one computes the number of times that a particular element was
present in the criminal event, and multiplies each element's total by its
corresponding weight. The sum total of these amounts, when added to-
gether, will yield the severity score for the event.
The proposed system may be illustrated by using a concrete exam-
ple. Consider the following event:
A man broke into a house, intimidated its three occupants with a danger-
ous weapon, took property valued at $1,000, and upon leaving, raped one
of the occupants and killed the other two.
If we go to Table 3 and fill the corresponding spaces,8 2 the total
weighted severity score for this event will be 82. The event can be bro-
ken down into separately valued components as follows: 46 (23 x 2) for
the murders, 23 for the rape, 6 for the intimidation by weapon, 2 for the
breaking and 5 for the property stolen.
83
By calculating a weighted total score for each criminal event, this
method provides an objective measure of the relative seriousness of each
crime on a severity scale developed through measuring the population's
perceptions of various crimes. In other words, this system yields a meas-"
ure of offense severity proportional to other criminal conduct along the
seriousness dimension, and accordingly, to the public's perception of so-
cial harm resulting from the act. The proposed method thus satisfies the
principles of parity among similarly situated offenders, and proportion-
ality of crime severity, both of which are required by the eighth
amendment.
A problem raised by incorporating seriousness scoring into Puerto
Rico's sanctioning structure is that the scheme cannot assess the serious-
ness of non-index offenses-those offenses in which no personal injury,
theft or property damage is involved-nor of attempts. To overcome
this problem, we suggest using the scores derived through the straight-
forward rating procedure8 4 of the national replication of the severity
81 See supra note 50. For the statistical procedure used in the derivation of the above
weights, see D. Nevares-Muniz, Penal Codification in Puerto Rico: A Sentencing Model
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1981).
82 The table of the scoring system, except for the weights, is a replication of one suggested
by T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, su ira note 3, at 402.
83 In Puerto Rico, that person will be indicted for rape, felony murder, burglary, and
theft. The penalty may be 99 years, and a 30-year presumptive term for rape.
84 Straightforward rating refers to the procedure in which the sample is required to esti-
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scale.8 5 An alternative possibility is to perform a replication of the Sel-
lin-Wolfgang scale using a population sample of Puerto Rican residents.
In the event that legislators seek to include aggravating factors,
such as the presence of co-participants, or additional offense elements in
a seriousness scoring model, appropriate scores may be derived by using
the straightforward scaling method developed by Sellin and Wolfgang
for assessing severity of offense descriptions.8 6 By using this method, in-
dividual weights can be attributed to the specified factors contained in
the criminal event.
Once offenses are weighted and scaled according to their serious-
ness, the next step is to set correspondingly proportionate penalties in
the Penal Code. This task may be approached from two directions.
First, we could construct an empirically developed punishment se-
verity scale matching the crime severity scale. This would be the most
appropriate method for scaling penalties, provided a valid and reliable
punishment scale that satisfies all constitutional safeguards could be
designed. Unfortunately, criminological researchers have not yet been
able to design a valid, reliable and empirically developed punishment
severity scale that can be generalized to a sentencing model either for
Puerto Rico or for the States.
87
The second alternative would be to construct a punishment scale
based on theoretical legal and criminological principles. Under this ap-
proach, the sentencing authority would select a punishment deemed ap-
propriate for any one offense weight in the crime severity scale. Given
this determination, punishments for other criminal events could be ap-
portioned relative to the ratios of offense seriousness. Offenses within
specified severity ranges would have a corresponding punishment in the
scale as developed. Through this "tracking" method, offense punish-
ment proportionality would be attained.
We suggest that the Legislature create a sentencing commission to
construct a punishment severity scale. The commission could be in-
structed to satisfy the fundamental constitutional requirements for sanc-
tioning, and also to give consideration to current empirical research in
the development of punishment scales. 88 We do not suggest specific
penalty ranges, but emphasize that the constitutional requirement of
parsimony (i.e., the least restrictive sanction) must be acknowledged ex-
plicitly in the statute. Furthermore, the offense's relative proportional-
mate the seriousness magnitude of a crime as compared to a modulus. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 85-87.
85 See National Survey of Crime Severity, supra note 63.
86 T. SELLIN, & M. WOLFGANG, supra note 3, at Chap. 10.




ity should be followed, and no aggravating factors should be added to
the base penalty term, as these are accounted for in the seriousness scor-
ing of the criminal event. Mitigating circumstances must be limited to
those defenses and extenuating factors explicitly included in the Code.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of offense-punishment scales such as the scale proposed in
this study, is the sentencing alternative most readily available to counter
the problems of arbitrariness, disparity and disproportionality in current
state sentencing statutes. Through its incorporation of a proportionality
analysis, a valid and reliable offense severity scale can be an appropriate
objective measure through which to consider the gravity of both the of-
fense and the penalty, as mandated by the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the eighth amendment.
8 9
89 See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3007-12; Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3372.
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